

MOUMITA ROY

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EDUCATION

George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A.

August 2016 - Present

Ph.D. student in The Interdisciplinary Center of Economic Science
Department of Economics

George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A

August 2016- May 2018

M.A. student in The Interdisciplinary Center of Economic Science
Department of Economics

Madras School of Economics, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India

August 2013- May 2015

M.Sc. student of Applied Quantitative Finance
Department of Economics

Presidency College, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

August 2010- May 2013

B.Sc. Student
Department of Economics

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Primary: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Applied Microeconomics

Secondary: Identity Economics, Political Economy, Development Economics

PUBLICATIONS

Clientelism and Identity (with James Habyarimana, Daniel Houser, Stuti Khemani, Victor Brech, Ginny Seung Choi) *Economic and Political Studies*, forthcoming. Accepted in October 2019

Electoral clientelism or vote buying has been regarded as undermining democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of the state towards its citizens, especially the poor. Social identity as a form of political mobilization may contribute to this, enabling support to be won with clientelist transfers. This paper reports data from a novel laboratory experiment designed to examine whether clientelism can be sustained as a political strategy, and whether identity impacts the nature or efficacy of clientelism. Specifically, we design a voting and leadership game in order to examine whether individuals vote for clientelist allocations by a leader even at the expense of more efficient and egalitarian allocations. We find group identity does not significantly impact the prevalence of clientelist plans. Leaders are more likely, however, to choose allocations that provide fewer benefits (lower rents) to the leader when the leader is part of the majority in-group than when they are in the minority.

WORKING PAPER

Identity, Leadership and Cooperation: An experimental analysis (with Daniel Houser)

Effective leaders promote cooperation in groups. While much research has informed approaches to effective leadership, little is known about how a leader's social identity, in relation to the identity of their group, might impact their effectiveness. Here we report data from leader-follower games where each groups leader either shares or does not share the followers social identity. Our main finding is that in-group leaders are more effective than those from the out-group. In particular, in-group leaders

are more likely to suggest greater cooperation than out-group leaders, and in-group leaders suggestions are more likely to be followed. That out-group leaders both expect and receive less cooperation than in-group leaders raise an important challenge to achieving the well-documented organizational benefits that stem from a diverse and inclusive workplace.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Effectiveness of vote-buying: An experimental investigation (with Daniel Houser)

Clientelism is a barrier to economic development. Understanding how politicians provide clientelistic benefits involves understanding both the enforcement mechanism and the voting behavior. Our paper uses a dynamic model of clientelism to provide experimental evidence of vote-buying in a political competition. It also reports data on the incumbents advantage in the absence of a properly enforced secret ballot. Our design which builds on the spatial model developed in Stokes (2005) analyzes an infinitely-repeated prisoners dilemma played between an incumbent politician who can buy votes by providing clientelistic benefits and a potential supporter. As the incumbents can monitor voters actions imperfectly, they can decide to punish the voters who did not provide support after receiving the benefits. We hope our findings will show that the moderate supporters of the incumbent are targeted whose electoral behavior can be changed easily with resources. The findings of this study will also contribute to the broader literature on the association between development and clientelism. Our paper attempts to understand how clientelism is enforced by identifying the potential vote sellers. If a voter is poor, then a higher benefit will sway a poor moderate voter more than a rich moderate voter.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor - Summer 2020 - Microeconomic Principles (ECON 103), George Mason University.
Teaching Evaluations: **4.7/5.0**

Teaching Assistant - Spring 2019, 2020 - Applied Econometrics (ECON 535), George Mason University

Teaching Assistant - Fall 2019, 2020 - Gender Economics (ECON 496/895), George Mason University

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant - July 2015 to May 2016 - Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore

Assisted Dr. Gopal Naik on an Economic and Social Research Council sponsored project titled Information, Market Creation and Agricultural Growth. We provided six-hundred farmers real-time information about agriculture, especially about pests and diseases, by extension agents employed by the project. Data was collected before and after the intervention to understand impact of information on farm productivity and cost of production.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

Association of Private Enterprise Education, April 2019

Association of Private Enterprise Education, April 2020 (*paper accepted; conference cancelled due to COVID-19*)

PhD-Economics Virtual Seminar, June 2020

ESA Virtual World Meetings, September 2020

Applied Young Economist Webinar, October 2020

SEA Annual Meetings, November 2020

FELLOWSHIPS

ICES Ph.D Fellow, George Mason University (2016 - Present)

REFEREEING

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (JEBO)

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Statistical/Mathematical Packages : Stata, Eviews

Experiment Designs: oTree, zTree

General Programming: Python

Document preparation: L^AT_EX

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Hindi (fluent), Bengali (native)

REFERENCES

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